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NSC BRIEFING

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INDIAN-PAKISTANI TENSION

[REDACTED]

we do not believe that an outbreak

of hostilities between Pakistan and India is likely. Both the border incidents [REDACTED] and Nehru's Kashmir statement

probably are part of Nehru's campaign of expressing antagonism toward Western-sponsored defense alliances in Asia by means of a tougher policy

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toward Pakistan (a member of both SEATO and the Baghdad Pact). While this Indian pressure campaign may be reflected in additional border incidents, both Indian and Pakistani border units are under tight control, and large-scale fighting is not apt to begin spontaneously. Both nations can also resort to other maneuvers short of war. Pakistan intends to return the Kashmir issue to the United Nations in June, and Pakistani Prime Minister Chaudhri Mohammad Ali will probably also raise Kashmir in the conference of Commonwealth Prime Ministers scheduled for June in London. India already controls the valuable part of Kashmir, and can probably count on Soviet support on the issue in the UN.

4. The main immediate danger is probably not that of open war between India and Pakistan but, instead, the possibility that Nehru would undertake a policy of closer economic and political cooperation with the USSR--including the purchase of Soviet arms--if the West backs Pakistan strongly on the Kashmir issue.